

Weapon Delivery and Defense Methodologies

[Name of the Writer]

[Name of the Institution]

## Weapon Delivery and Defense Methodologies

### **Introduction/Overview**

In this part of the defense in both economic challenge is analyzed, i.e. attempts to answer the question of "how much" you mean the State meet the requirements of one of its primary functions and "how" funds are used. With remarkable, cultural, economic and social development unique geographical features, as well as a political-strategic conception that sees the defense in a coherent whole with other functions and activities of the State, it is not possible to generalizations or use analytical tools developed for other countries or regions with different geopolitical, economic, social and cultural realities (Schwartz, 2011).

The first concern, therefore, is to define a suitable methodology to reliably show what the economic effort that the country must do to be provided defense. In principle, this effort should not focus only as accounting sum of certain expenses incurred by individuals and institutions, but also must consider the set of objectives to be achieved to acquire defense (Schwenn, Chitikila, Laufer, Rozzi, Smythe, Best, & Graveline, 2011).

This methodology must satisfy the academic purposes of clarity and precision, as the political purposes of transparency and approval to expenditure incurred in other countries to provide themselves with identical property: defense. In short, the calculation methodology and analytical tools that support must be consistent and comparable with those developed for other realities. This requires understanding the defense in all its social and political role of the state as primary complexity, to define, then, in its economic sense. For defining the defense as an economic good is not he be reduced to a mere matter of expenditure but also financing,

participation in the product and in fiscal spending, impact on development and vice versa (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2011).

## **Discussion**

### **Economic Approach**

It is often said that the National Defence employs productive resources that could have alternative uses in other activities. In fact, it is common that the discussion on defense spending is associated to the debate on how to best allocate resources of the State, to the extent that society has limited resources to the existence of multiple needs that require hierarchical . This leads to the question of why state resources in defense and consider the options to determine the level of expenditure on various scenarios are spent.

Discussions have gained prominence due in particular to the process with globalization trends, including a decline in military spending, which was generated from the end of the Cold War in the world (Kiper, Hughley, & McClellan, 2010). This process also rigged with a new wave of establishment of democratic regimes, gave rise to the idea that it is possible to decrease the emphasis on security and defense spending, allowing, thus favoring other tasks that state involvement is essential. This view presumes that the balance of power between countries and emerging conflicts may be regulated primarily by way of negotiation, arbitration and understanding. According to this postulate, military spending should be restricted as important, because what has to prevail in the future is to maintain a sound system of international relations, based on the political weight of the countries within multinational mechanisms conflict resolution (Roscoe, 2010).

Against this argument, it suggests that we are still far from reaching a degree of international consensus on the mechanisms for resolving disputes. Indeed, problems remain permanent external and internal security, some historical and longstanding, unresolved by the trends towards globalization and integration. Moreover, these processes are a source of new conflicts, both within each country and in relations between neighbors (Kiper, Hughley, & McClellan, 2010).

Precisely to overcome the negative effects of more complex and delicate neighborhood and regional conflicts latent under uneven processes of growth and development among countries, it is necessary to build a favorable environment for increased investment, basic condition for economic and social development . But it is not wise to approach this task based on structurally reduce defense spending, but rather adjustments for technical or design a global policy. The defense is a basic social function for the existence of organized society in nation as well as a necessary condition for their existence and development over time. It is, therefore, a good and a good that must be funded (Schwenn, Chitikila, Laufer, Rozzi, Smythe, Best, & Graveline, 2011).

Financing defense is an economic challenge, in terms of the most satisfactory allocation of resources. Involves considering the preferences of society and determine what needs will be met and which are not within the resources available. The economic focus of the defense is in itself important, because it raises the issue of using, socially, poor and pursues the lowest possible cost for the property in question: the country's defense. The defense economics aims to contribute to a comprehensive approach to the problem, so they can take the best decisions possible.

Economic science studies the behavior of economic agents, trying to determine their motivations, objectives and constraints they face in achieving them. In general, the allocation of relatively scarce resources to multiple and ranked in order purposes is governed by market rules, which arbitrates the willingness of consumers to pay, firstly, to the cost of production of a good or service, the another. In other words, suppliers and customers express their "preference" in the market, some through the prices they are willing to pay, and others asking prices reflecting the opportunity cost of resources. However, this rule is difficult to practical application in the case of goods such as defense. In contrast to the transaction of private property through the Market, the defense has two distinguishing features (Schwartz, 2011).

The resources allocated to defense deviate consumption and investment in other areas, and this is their opportunity cost. Indeed, if the same tax resources from the sale of goods and services produced by the state from engaging in public or private spending (defense but different nature), then the structure of consumer spending and investment change. However, countries differ in the way they face the implicit sacrifice at the opportunity cost. What I want to emphasize is that the decision to carry out a specific defense policy, and make some strategic design in the military, with the economic effort that means, it goes beyond just economic considerations and is, in essence, a political decision linked to the existence, persistence and development of the nation.

### **Conclusion**

Such frameworks are determined by macroeconomic projections that determine the tax Availability for next year. These tax availability are prioritized among the objectives of the state and, according to them, the various ministries resources are allocated. For the Armed Forces, the

financial framework is regulated by the Constitutional Act (LOC) which governs them. The LOC of the Armed Forces establishes criteria that limit the framework. It should be noted that the financial framework defines a specific fiscal contribution for personal and fiscal support for other expenses. The Ministry of Defence Ministry of Finance presents the institutional budgets, including expenditure financed fiscal contribution within the financial framework and activities that require funding for additional fiscal support, outside the financial framework. Both ministries negotiate the provision of additional funds to increase or redistribute the framework and financing activities, considered a priority, not able to be covered within the frame. Finished this process, the budget is sent as a bill to Congress, which is the body that ultimately punishes the approval of expenditures, rejection or modification of some items.

## REFERENCES

- Hutchins, E. M., Cloppert, M. J., & Amin, R. M. (2011). Intelligence-driven computer network defense informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and intrusion kill chains. *Leading Issues in Information Warfare & Security Research*, 1, 80.
- Schwartz, S. I. (Ed.). (2011). *Atomic audit: the costs and consequences of US nuclear weapons since 1940*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Schwenn, R. E., Chitikila, R. C., Laufer, D. R., Rozzi, A. D., Smythe, W. P., Best, D. B., ... & Graveline, W. R. (2011). *Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs* (No. GAO-11-233SP). Government Accountability Office Washington Dc.
- Roscoe, S. A. (2010). *A comparison of the fully burdened cost of fuel methodologies employed across the Department of Defense*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA.
- Kiper, T. O., Hughley, A. E., & McClellan, M. R. (2010). *Batteries on the battlefield: Developing a methodology to estimate the fully burdened cost of batteries in the Department of Defense*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca Graduate School Of Business And Public Policy.